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AbsTrACT
This article analyses how and with what consequences 
body–mind relations (the sphere of the psychosomatic) 
are being modelled in the 21st century through 
considering the interdiscipline of neuropsychoanalysis. 
The promise of the term psychosomatic lies in its efforts 
to rework standard, bifurcated models of mind and 
body: somatic acts are simultaneously psychic acts. But 
neuropsychoanalysis, as it brings the neurosciences 
and psychoanalysis together to model an embodied 
’MindBrain’, ends up evacuating another potent 
characteristic found in much of the psychosomatic 
tradition—its refusal to adjudicate, a priori, what 
counts as the adaptive or well-regulated subject. The 
psychosomatic problem in psychoanalysis profoundly 
disturbs everyday models of functionality, adaptation 
and agency, by positing the psyche as an ’other’ of 
the physiological within the physiological. By contrast, 
neuropsychoanalysis ends up parsing too easily the 
healthy from the pathological body, such that it is only 
the latter that is subject to forces that work against 
self-preservation and self-regulation. In so doing, 
neuropsychoanalysis recasts the radical problematic that 
the psychosomatic installed for psychoanalysis in the 
direction of a corrective biology. This corrective biology 
is given form in two ways: (1) through translating the 
Freudian drive—that unruly and foundational concept 
which addresses the difficult articulation of soma 
and psyche—into a series of Basic Emotion Systems 
modelled by the affective neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp 
and (2) through resituating and quarantining the 
troubling, non-adaptive aspects of the Freudian psyche 
within the domain of addiction. That easy separation 
between the healthy and the pathological is all too 
often found in current descriptions of healthcare and 
patient encounters. The article refuses it and calls for 
the revivification of other ways of thinking about how 
human subjects—psychosomatic organisms—find ways 
to live, and to die.
How is the mind to recognise itself in, say, an act of 
vomiting? The real mystery is not ‘the mysterious leap 
from mind to body’: how something mental, an idea, 
can cause something physical, like vomiting, to occur. 
The real mystery is how it is possible for there to have 
been no leap. How could vomiting itself be ‘thinking’? 
How could we recognise the mental in something so 
physical?1
Jonathan Lear, in his philosophical explication of 
psychoanalysis as the attempt to imagine what a 
science of subjectivity might be, uses the example 
of vomiting to revisit Freud’s famous description of 
the ‘puzzling leap from the mental to the physical’.2 
That leap for Freud was best exemplified through 
his account of hysterical conversion, and Felix 
Deutsch later took up both the leap and a model 
of conversion in On the Mysterious Leap from 
the Mind to the Body.3 Lear challenges a model in 
which ‘the mental’, as a distinct sphere of action, 
comes to cause something physical, and instead sets 
our sights on the strangeness of vomiting as itself 
thinking. Such a claim demands an ontological and 
epistemological shift. The ejection of matter carries 
meaning; it raises questions of relationality and 
intention, of what is wished outside or inside. These 
are well in excess of a straightforward need to rid 
the body of physiologically registered toxins. What 
might vomiting be if we choose not to interpret 
it either as simply an involuntary muscular spasm 
or the effect of a mental act? In challenging bien 
pensant understandings of bodies and body–mind 
relations, the invitation to see vomiting as thinking 
suggests, instead, that there is an ‘other’ of the 
physiological within the physiological. How would 
one unravel the kind of thinking—ferocious, desta-
bilising or melancholic—that occurs as and through 
vomiting? What kind of body, in other words, is the 
subject who vomits, or shakes or faints?
The desire to disrupt standard, bifurcated models 
of mind and body can be found in many strands of 
research and practice that are in some way indebted 
to psychoanalysis. This article focuses on the strand 
which calls itself neuropsychoanalysis. As its name 
testifies, neuropsychoanalysis is an attempt to map 
psychoanalysis through a certain kind of neurosci-
ence, grounding the Freudian unconscious through 
neurobiological correlates, thereby opening up a 
location for the psyche–soma (the psychosomatic) 
which would revitalise both partners. We use the 
term psychosomatic throughout this article in a 
capacious way—as a difficult term with numerous 
histories and one which signals attempts to account 
for how the psyche and the body are intimately 
bound up with one another. We consider the 
neuropsychoanalytic project in light of the concern 
that this special issue (on biopolitics and psycho-
somatics) has with how the assumed divisions 
between mind and matter, and the mental and the 
somatic, have been both a provocation and a lure 
for analysis and for therapeutics. In this context, we 
are interested in understanding how neuropsychoa-
nalysis arranges mind and matter, nature and value 
through an explicit commitment to install subjective 
intentionality within rather than alongside biology.4
While medical humanities as a field has so far 
engaged relatively little with neuropsychoana-
lytic texts, this work has received some analytical 
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attention within the humanities more broadly.5 And some writers 
have shown interest in the emerging interdiscipline as a space to 
advance the medical humanities. For example, the philosopher 
Catherine Malabou, in The New Wounded: From Neurosis to 
Brain Damage, argues that neuropsychoanalysis ‘recognises the 
essential and reciprocal link between the life of the brain and 
subjective experience’.6 In particular, Malabou is interested in 
how neuropsychoanalysis ties psyche, affects, body and brain 
together—by placing the regime of sexuality and that of cere-
brality on the same plane. Equally, the writer Siri Hustvedt 
discusses the influence of a neuropsychoanalytic group on her 
development of a psychosomatic account of the ‘mysteries of 
[her] own nervous system’ consequent on a shaking fit she expe-
rienced while giving a public talk about her father (who had 
died 2 years previously).7 We see, here, how neuropsychoanal-
ysis is being put to work with reference to the question of the 
psychosomatic: it appears to promise a way of overcoming the 
sequestration of brain (matter) from mind, of affect from cogni-
tive intentionality, of sexual logics from cerebral logics, of the 
corporeal from the mental.
We maintain that the neuropsychoanalytic commitment to an 
embodied subjective intentionality is actualised via recourse to 
a neuroevolutionary backdrop that plays a determining role in 
both the interpretation of experimental findings and the solidi-
fication of overarching concepts. While neuropsychoanalysis is 
currently a relatively minor enterprise (both within the neuro-
sciences and within psychoanalysis), we argue that its substan-
tial claims carry significance for how the relationship between 
psyche and soma is being envisaged in the 21st century. This 
is because, first, neurospsychoanalysis interprets the Freudian 
unconscious through the conceptual apparatus of a certain kind 
of affective neuroscience and thereby posits not only a new foun-
dation for the psyche–soma but notably one that, its proponents 
argue, demonstrates fidelity to Freud’s own neurological origins. 
Second, neuropsychoanalysis recasts the problematic that the 
psychosomatic installed for psychoanalysis in the direction of 
what we are calling a corrective biology. While the psychoso-
matic problem in psychoanalysis profoundly disturbed everyday 
models of functionality, adaptation and agency—see also Monica 
Greco’s contribution to this special issue8—the ontologies of 
the subjective which are advanced by neuropsychoanalysis end 
up parsing too easily the distinction between the healthy and 
the pathological body. It is only the latter that is conceived as 
moving against self-preservation and self-regulation. Both these 
neuropsychoanalytic moves threaten to evacuate what is most 
potent in that powerful strand of psychoanalytic and psycho-
somatic writings which has refused to adjudicate, a priori, what 
counts as the adaptive or well-regulated subject.
In what follows, we discuss how neuropsychoanalysts 
make use of affective neuroscience—and the research of Jaak 
Panskepp in particular—to translate that most troublesome and 
antagonistic of psychoanalytic concepts, the Freudian drive, as 
a series of Basic Emotion Systems (BESs), which propel bodies 
to engage with and respond to their environment. This transla-
tion, which produces an ‘embodied brain’ as a new foundation 
for the psyche–soma, comprises, we argue, the most important 
joist that has allowed the neuropsychoanalytic structure to gain 
enough solidity and methodological consistency to propagate 
itself as a community and as a body of knowledge—even as many 
of its concepts and theories remain contested. We focus on the 
Freudian drive not only insofar as it names one of the most foun-
dational concepts within psychoanalysis, but also because drive 
theory is Freud’s attempt to address the relationship between 
the psyche and the body by pulling the so-called ‘puzzling leap’ 
in the opposite direction. That is, the drive is a ‘concept on the 
frontier between the mental and the somatic’—it designates 
a turnpike at which the psyche emerges from and acts on the 
body.9 In the final part of the article, we briefly consider how 
neuropsychoanalysis presses its reworked drives—now hooked 
into Panksepp’s Basic Emotion Systems—into the complex 
question of addiction. This elaboration of addiction is an exem-
plary instance in which neuropsychoanalytic accounts install the 
embodied brain by cleaving apart appropriately and inappro-
priately (pathologically) activated subjects—subjects motivated 
by life-affirming pleasures from those whose drive has been 
hijacked by something other than self-preservation. We ask what 
it might mean to refuse that easy separation, one which is all 
too often found in current descriptions of healthcare and patient 
encounters, so as to revivify other means of thinking about how 
human subjects—psychosomatic organisms—find ways to live 
and to die.
NeurOpsyChOANAlysis ANd The embOdied brAiN
Neuropsychoanalysis is a diverse, interdisciplinary field that 
comprises the efforts of researchers and clinicians within several 
branches of psychoanalysis, the neurosciences and psychiatry to 
construct a shared space of inquiry in which ‘to consider how 
empirical findings and neuroscientific theories can be enhanced 
by metapsychological knowledge derived from subjective, clin-
ical observation and vice versa’.10 It was named and constituted 
by a small group of researchers at whose heart lies the psycho-
analyst and neuropsychologist Mark Solms. Solms was one of 
the founding editors of the journal Neuropsychoanalysis, the 
launch of which in 1999 constituted the first formal use of the 
term neuropsychoanalysis to demarcate a field. While neuro-
psychoanalysis as a self-described field is thus a 21st century 
phenomenon, its emergence enacts a particular turn within a 
much lengthier set of engagements between psychoanalysis and 
the neurosciences.11 Solms himself, frequently in collaboration 
with Karen Kaplan-Solms (also a psychoanalyst and neuropsy-
chologist), has been working since the 1980s to bring to light 
the extent of Freud’s own neuroscientific and neuroanatomical 
research, prior to his decisive turn away from neurology in the 
1890s.12 The main neuropsychoanalytic claim is that conscious-
ness must be understood as both affective and embodied and that 
the Freudian theory of the psychic apparatus, while falling short 
in bringing together mind, brain and body, nevertheless provides 
us with the foundations for such an understanding (notably the 
first congress of the fledgling discipline in 2000 was on the topic 
of emotion).13 For Solms, Freud’s model of the psychical appa-
ratus, is grounded in, and through, affect—even as the affective 
‘basement’ exists in Freud despite Freud’s own predilection for 
higher level, ‘cognitively oriented’ models.14 These important 
psychoanalytic insights were neglected, however, on Solms’ 
account, by the ‘behaviourist juggernaut’ and, then, subse-
quently, by the information-processing excesses of cognitivism.15 
As neuropsychoanalysis emerged, then, Solms and his close 
collaborators consciously imagined it both as a return to Freud’s 
affective emphasis, and as a fulfilment of Freud’s own ambition 
for a bridge between the neuronal and the psychic. In producing 
such a bridge, neuropsychoanalysis then also comes as a response 
to the rallying call made by the Nobel Prize-winning neurosci-
entist Eric Kandel for the convergence of disciplines addressing 
the mind. In 1999, Kandel pointed to the ‘excitement and 
success’ surrounding current biology and proleptically described 
‘a unified discipline of neurobiology, cognitive psychology and 
psychoanalysis’ that would be capable of ‘forg[ing] a new and 
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deeper understanding of mind’.16 In the introductory issue of 
Neuropsychoanalysis, Solms and Nersessian announced that the 
journal’s goal was ‘to create an ongoing dialogue with the aim 
of reconciling psychoanalytic and neuroscientific perspectives on 
the mind [italics added]’17 and explicitly employed the concept 
of ‘consilience’18 and the language of a ‘unity of purpose’.19 It is 
the language of bridges, consilience, dialogue, unification and 
reconciliation that comes to demarcate the space of the inter-, or 
a movement across.
pANksepp ANd AffeCTive NeurOsCieNCe
It is on the terrain on which and through which the psycho-
somatic was itself elaborated—that of the affects and of their 
intimate entwinement with the somatic—that neuropsychoanal-
ysis is built. At the first Neuropsychoanalytic Congress in 2000, 
Solms argued that:
[W]e have to find a point of contact between contemporary neuro-
science and psychoanalysis, which will most likely be at the level of 
[a] basic theory of the basic mechanisms of emotion. If we can find a 
level where the language and concepts of contemporary neuroscience 
match the language of psychoanalysis, we will have a foothold… 20
For Solms and his collaborators, affective neuroscience 
provides such a foothold: it is a theory marking out the inter-im-
plication of psyche and soma, an inter-implication which Freud 
had attempted to engage through his conceptualisation of the 
drives. The figure who enabled this translation was Jaak Pank-
sepp, a leading affective neuroscientist whose research focused 
on affect in non-human animals.21 Solms and his collaborators 
need Panksepp because affective neuroscience is able to provide 
a theory of the ‘basement’. Solms is thereby able to find his 
foothold in Panksepp’s formulation of Basic Emotion Systems: 
‘nomothetic endogenous behavioural and affective resources of 
the organism’.22 Nearly 20 years on from Solms’s call at the first 
neuropsychoanalytic congress, these ‘nomothetic endogenous’ 
resources of the organism are now hard baked into much of the 
neuropsychoanalytic architecture. Panksepp’s formulations will 
ensure that Solms is able to lay out a tidy basement, one fully 
aligned with self-preservation and self-regulation. This has fore-
stalled the elaboration of what we argue would be more supple 
means through which neuropsychoanalysis might articulate how 
human subjects, as psychosomatic entities, are riven by complex 
affective relationships both with their own suffering and with 
the milieu in which they are embedded.
Panksepp offers a vision in which affects, far from being 
epiphenomenal, are central to what ‘motivate[s] the organism to 
promote its survival and reproductive success’.23 His argument, 
developed in his 1998 book Affective Neuroscience, emerged 
through his research on unconditioned behaviours in animals, 
that is, on behaviours which do not originate in priming and 
learning tasks.24 Panksepp posited that mammals engage in 
action in the world as a response to a series of endogenous and 
discrete ‘primal “feeling networks”’.25 He distinguished seven 
such feeling networks or Basic Emotion Systems (BESs), with 
specific yet interlocking sites in the subcortical regions of the 
brain. Neurochemical activity across these regions generates 
different adaptive patterns of behaviour: mating behaviour 
(LUST), fight or flight responses (FEAR and RAGE), separation 
anxiety (PANIC), social bonding (CARE) and rough and tumble 
(PLAY).26 Notably, one of these systems, which Panksepp called 
SEEKING, underlies and enables the others, constituting an orig-
inary orientation towards the world, an exploratory disposition. 
While nominally a feeling network, SEEKING does not have a 
specific feeling tone proper to it but acts as a booster of sorts to 
the other basic emotions. SEEKING is not reactive to specific 
external stimuli: rather, it is plugged into bodily need detectors 
and is the means by which homeostatic imbalances turn into an 
urge to call forth objects which would redress them.27 Pank-
sepp calls this urge ‘a goad without a goal’.28 Its prototypical 
instantiation is mammalian foraging behaviour, exemplified in 
Panksepp’s experiments by the whisker-twitching rat sniffing out 
the space around her. SEEKING is a kind of global ‘anticipatory 
excitement’, an adaptive twitching which orients mammals to 
the world and predisposes them towards ‘life-supporting affor-
dances of the world’ through a euphoric bribe.29
Solms and his various collaborators make use of Panksepp to 
rewrite the Freudian drives as the foundation of the ‘embodied 
brain’ (which they call ‘MindBrain’). This is indeed at the heart 
of their project to undo the mind–body bifurcation, to rework 
what the psychosomatic might mean. To this end, they make use 
of Freud’s oft-quoted definition of the drives from ‘Instincts and 
Their Vicissitudes’ as ‘the psychical representative of the stimuli 
originating from within the organism and reaching the mind, as 
a measure of the demand made on the mind for work in conse-
quence to its connection with the body’.30 In the neuropsycho-
analytic rewriting of the drive, the stimuli are the physiological 
imbalances in the visceral body, which are felt as qualitatively 
expressed pressures (basic emotions) orienting the subject 
towards a very specific kind of work. This work is making use 
of objects in the world that would relieve such pressures and 
still the body’s clamour. For neuropsychoanalysis, then, drives, 
mapped on to Panksepp’s BESs, serve to regulate homeostatic 
imbalances by motivating the organism to search for objects 
appropriate for the correction of these imbalances.31
The TrOuble Of The drive
Yet, this emphasis on the drive as a means of regulating the 
visceral body does not fully address the full purpose of Freud’s 
work on drive theory. The path of the drive (Trieb) in Freud is 
particularly complex. Freud famously described the theory of 
the drives in his ‘New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis’ 
as ‘our mythology’: drives ‘are mythical entities, magnificent 
in their indefiniteness. In our work we cannot for a moment 
disregard them, yet we are never sure that we are seeing them 
clearly’.32 The reference to mythology concerns the later, more 
speculative and more frequently contested aspects of Freud’s 
work, which introduce the duality of life and death drives, or 
Eros and Thanatos. However, this leap to the mythological, 
while marking the moment in Freud’s work where he is arguably 
at the furthest from clinical observation, is in fact made in an 
attempt to negotiate a paradoxical persistence that is borne out 
within clinical observation, namely, that the psyche’s work can in 
no way be wholly captured by the vital register of self-preserva-
tion, nor indeed by the call to pleasure understood as satisfaction 
of need and consummation of tension. At the heart of Freud’s 
elaborations regarding the origin and vicissitudes of the drive 
is his interest in the origin and vicissitudes of fantasy. As Jean 
Laplanche and Jean-Betrand Pontalis made so clear in their 1968 
essay on fantasy and psychic reality, it is only by detaching sexu-
ality ‘from any natural object’ and ‘hand[ing] [sexuality] over to 
fantasy’ that sexuality might start existing in psychoanalysis as 
sexuality.33 That fantasy, and psychic reality, threaten perpetu-
ally to be lost or marginalised in psychoanalytic metapsychology 
across the decades provides evidence of how difficult it is to 
envisage the profound challenge fantasy offers to the standard 
bifurcation that is made between the categories of the real (the 
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material) and of the imaginary. As we shall see, the manner in 
which neuropsychoanalysis attempts to articulate the psyche–
soma means that fantasy is either elided or its strange potency 
vitiated.
In this regard, we should be clear that Freud’s mythological 
moment in relation to the drive was his third attempt to theo-
rise his persistent conviction that the psyche’s work can in no 
way be wholly captured by the vital register of self-preservation, 
and, with it, to understand the relationship between the body’s 
vital needs and that attachment to a certain suffering. Freud 
initially conceived of drives as bodily demands related to sexual 
excitation by provisionally distinguishing, in 1905, the sexual 
drive from other biological needs (such as the need for nourish-
ment).34 In 1910–1911, he then bifurcated the drives through 
opposing sexual and life preservation elements (now instanti-
ated as ego-drives).35 Finally, in 1920, Freud offered the more 
‘mythic’ opposition between the life and death drives, supple-
mented by their composites.36 In this last opposition, self-preser-
vation was integrated with a certain sexuality under the auspices 
of Eros, both working to regulate bodily needs of different 
kinds. However, this integration was once again countered by a 
certain principle of dysregulation, now operating in the name of 
Thanatos, the death drive, a repetition compulsion that undoes 
the regulatory hypothesis of the pleasure principle. What persists 
across the different iterations of the drives is the notion that the 
psychic apparatus is animated by a conflict, even as the contours 
and stakes of this conflict change. In the first instantiation, drives 
diverge from bodily needs and sexuality from self-preservation. 
In the second, this divergence remains, but now self-preserva-
tion is also folded into the level of drive; while in the third, the 
mythology of Eros and Thanatos provides the metapsycholog-
ical framework for a radical negativity introduced by the repeti-
tion compulsion, a negativity that is not simply at variance with 
self-preservation, but which specifically operates as its undoing. 
Indeed, one could venture that the psyche, rather than naming 
an ‘other’ of the soma, is the very instantiation of this conflict as 
such. What persists in Freud, and is articulated with increasing 
clarity in his later work, is a sense that there is something funda-
mental in and to the subject which undoes the subject, or, one 
might say, there is a persistence of and attachment to suffering 
that lies beyond the pleasure principle. And this is an unhomely 
attachment. Freud, in imagining the response to the ‘improb-
ability of [his] speculations’, as he considers the ‘impulsion to 
self-destruction’, offers a startling image of the psychosomatic: 
‘A queer instinct, indeed, directed to the destruction of its own 
organic home!’37 The queer and complex vision that Freud 
sketches here—in which the organic is host to a force that runs 
fundamentally counter to its hospitality—is, we shall see, one 
that will not be replicated in neuropsychoanalysis. There, we 
find instead what might be described as an orthotic logic—one 
driven by a commitment to a certain kind of normativity in terms 
of the regulatory dynamics of the human subject. That orthotic 
logic will attempt to straighten things out and put the soma and 
the psyche back in their place.
Furthermore, and contra Stratchey’s English-language transla-
tion of Freud’s Trieb as ‘instinct’, an extensive body of scholarship 
has shown that drives are not the same as biological instincts.38 
Freud argued in his ‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality’ 
that heterosexual intercourse is not biologically programmed, 
but an outcome of a certain ‘civilising’ of the drive, one which 
is never guaranteed or finalised. Indeed, not only do drives 
lack the pre-fitted objects typical of instincts but, crucially, this 
contingency of their object is framed by the dynamics of repeti-
tion: the finding of an object figures as a return to a lost object 
in which there is—unavoidably and painfully—a phantasmatic 
dimension. As the psychoanalyst André Green has argued: libido 
originates ‘[i]n the interlacing of impulse and phantasy’: ‘where 
the impulse brings energy, whether expended or pent up, the 
phantasy acts as a vector orienting and directing,…through the 
object and through narcissism’.39 This phantasmatic element is 
indispensable. That the drives are not instincts opens, too, a 
deep cleft between psychological and behavioural accounts, on 
the one hand, in which self-preservation drives the entirety of 
the organism, and psychoanalysis. As Freud indicated in his post-
humously published expository and synthetic work ‘An Outline 
of Psycho-Analysis’:
The power of the id expresses the true purpose of the individual or-
ganism’s life. This consists in the satisfaction of its innate needs. No 
such purpose as that of keeping itself alive or of protecting itself from 
dangers by means of anxiety can be attributed to the id.40
This cleft between the psychological and the psychoanalytic 
is, we argue, closed by neuropsychoanalysis. A prudent manage-
ment of the drive makes Freud’s drive much more congruent 
with standard scientific, adaptational accounts. Solms, for 
example, in a section on Trieb in his discussion of the forth-
coming revised standard edition of Freud, appears to encourage 
such congruence by arguing that ‘The scientific meaning of 
“drive” is also constantly evolving’, and ‘[c]urrently … appears 
to imply narrower forms of homeostatic regulation of the bodily 
economy than Freud, perhaps, intended in his usage of Trieb’.41 
What we witness in the neuropsychoanalytic recasting of Freud 
is that the register of self-preservation becomes, contra Freud, 
the task of the psychic apparatus in its entirety.42
While this neuropsychoanalytic translation expands the bodily 
dimension of Freud’s definition of the drive, and carries forward 
elements of all three iterations of his drive theory, it does so at a 
price. It curiously elides the oppositional dynamic, the conflict 
which animates all iterations, and the tenacity of which necessi-
tates Freud’s iterations in the first place. Indeed, in the neuropsy-
choanalytic gloss, bodily needs are not split off from sexuality 
(the first iteration of Freud’s theory of the drives). On the one 
hand, sexual pleasure (Panksepp’s LUST) becomes one of many 
pleasurable interactions with the world;43 on the other, the 
foundational dimension of the drive, its pressure (Drang), now 
expressed as SEEKING, provides an underlying, undifferenti-
ated orientation to the world in the service of all bodily needs, 
whether they be emotional or gastric (the prototypical instanti-
ation of SEEKING for Solms and Panksepp is, after all, animal 
foraging behaviour, and they term the function of the system 
‘appetitive’). Equally, the opposition between sexuality and what 
Freud called ego-drives or self-preservation (the second itera-
tion of Freud’s theory of the drives) is weakened here. To the 
expanded bodily realm of positive affects and pluralized satia-
tions, Solms and his collaborators juxtapose a sober guardian:
[the] embodied, instinctual brain—must of necessity be constrained 
by the cognitive brain and its predictive modeling… 44
The reference to the ‘cognitive brain’ signals a return to the 
body–mind split via a distinction between the pleasure and 
reality principles. But this is a curious and diminished return: 
the embodied brain, as mapped through Panksepp’s BESs, and 
through SEEKING in particular, delivers a rather odd pleasure 
principle, which is no longer equivalent to Freud’s own.45 This is 
because in Panksepp’s system there is an assumed primal yoking 
between pleasure and self-preservation: as Mark Solms and 
Margaret Zellner state, ‘to the extent that our vital needs are 
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met, satisfied, we feel pleasure’ (indeed the BESs are biologically 
encoded, phylogenetic memories of this yoking).46 We would do 
well here to remember the extensive body of psychoanalytic and 
psychosomatic literature that demonstrates how the satisfaction 
of ‘vital needs’ so frequently does not bring the human subject 
the feeling of pleasure.
But that is not the tradition, of course, in which Panksepp’s 
research is embedded. For it is important to remember that 
SEEKING is defined as powering up exploration for ‘things that 
will ultimately propagate our genes’.47 In a sense, Panksepp and 
Solms’s evolutionary reading of the drives folds them within a 
narrative of self- and species preservation, and means that these 
constitute the reality principle avant la lettre. Indeed, this config-
uration is perhaps closest to Freud’s concept of a life drive—or 
to Eros, in his third and more speculative iteration of the drive 
theory, one which similarly mobilises the pleasure principle in the 
direction of self-preservation. However, again, Freud postulated 
Eros in his attempt to address the curious insistence in clinical 
observation of an attachment to suffering, or of forces beyond 
the pleasure principle. This insistence of the non-adaptive in the 
subject—one of the names for which is the death drive—itself 
marks the perpetual problem at work in the drive. That a certain 
kind of self-destruction lies at the heart of psychic functioning 
has also been of profound importance to psychosomatic investi-
gations—for example, in those of the Paris School of Psychoso-
matics.48 But what happens if this insistence of the non-adaptive is 
refused? When, for example, the neuropsychoanalytic elaboration 
of the domain of the psychosomatic is underwritten by an affective 
neuroscience organised around the urges characterising mamma-
lian foraging behaviour? In the final part of our article, we read 
neuropsychoanalytic models of addiction as one important attempt 
to address and—crucially—exorcise the refractory problem of the 
conflictual drive, and of the non-adaptive that lies at the heart of 
the human subject. If the neuropsychoanalytic elaboration of the 
embodied mind claims to dissolve the divide between matter and 
mind, it simultaneously, and relatedly, commits to a divide between 
the appropriately regulated, and distressingly dysregulated, subject.
mAlfuNCTiONiNg bOdies: AddiCTiON ANd uNreAl 
ObjeCTs
The neuropsychoanalytic reorientation of Freudian drive theory 
as the expression of an expanded, correctly adaptive body means 
that any non-adaptive activation of the BESs and of the SEEKING 
system in particular, that is, an activation that neither ensures the 
survival of the organism nor contributes to reproductive success, 
needs to be understood through a reference to malfunction and not 
as something inherent to the embodied brain.
In a 2011 review paper with the compelling subtitle ‘Why 
depression feels so bad and what addicts really want’,49 some of 
the key proponents of neuropsychoanalysis discuss a series of such 
malfunctions in a reading of the (then) latest neurobiological find-
ings on addiction. This they present as a definitive elaboration on 
the question of motivation and drive, as well as an updating of 
Freud. Margaret Zellner, Douglas Watt, Mark Solms and Jaak Pank-
sepp argue that addictions constitute a pathological dysregulation 
of the organism’s emotional systems, both appetitive (SEEKING) 
and consummatory (LUST, CARE and PLAY), which they term a 
‘hijacking’ of the drive. Crucially, here addictions are pathological 
insofar as they are—as neuropsychoanalysts put it—pseudo-appeti-
tive. That is, addicts satisfy their urges in the absence of ‘real’ objects 
in the world. What is meant by ‘real’ here is very specific: it is a 
worldly, functional affordance which supports life by supporting 
regulation. The substances addicts use are not construed as ‘real’ 
because they feed (increase) craving but do not satisfy ‘biological 
needs’. For example, ‘opiate-induced hedonic fog’ generates a 
feeling of satisfaction as an ‘empty (objectless) pleasure.’50
Not incidentally, the authors relate the pleasure of addiction 
to that of compulsive masturbation to argue that they are both 
‘pleasure without attachment or worse: substitutive pleasure in the 
absence of a specific longed-for object’.51 In the concluding state-
ments of their paper, they turn to Freud’s early 1898 paper ‘Sexu-
ality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses’,52 arguing that he regarded 
masturbation as a ‘“primal addiction” that may serve as a substi-
tute for mature sexual relations’,53 such that the masturbator’s 
urges can only be addressed by the ‘reestablishment of “normal 
sexual life”’.54 In line with Freud’s suggestions, they propose that 
the addict too can be restored through a re-engagement with life-
giving affordances provided by ‘social attachment’ as well as ‘all 
other rewarding aspects of loving interaction’.55 Thus, addictive 
and masturbatory pleasures alike represent a hijacking or pseu-
do-activation of urges/drives, insofar as they operate outside a 
biologically fitted purpose—that is, they do not promote social 
and reproductive fittedness, respectively. This equation of the real 
with the biologically fitted purpose qualifies and delimits Panksepp 
and Solms’ insistence on the primary objectlessness of the BESs 
and differentiates such objectlessness from Freud’s insistence that 
the object of the drive is contingent.56 For Panksepp and Solms, 
BESs do not have a fixed object but they do motivate and reward 
an orientation to the world and its life-giving affordances. For 
Freud, satisfaction, or indeed excitation, does not bear a necessary 
relation to self-preservation or species preservation: indeed, the 
uncoupling of the subject from self-preservation is what the psyche 
does. Psychoanalysis is a (potentially) interminable project precisely 
because this relation is not a given but has to be forged. Because of 
this, any object can come to be seized by the drive—including, of 
course, the subject’s own body. In this sense, the object of the drives 
is never quite ‘real’. It is insofar as the object is de-routed from its 
functional purpose and becomes fantasmatically invested that the 
object affords satisfaction (whether that object is a fetishist’s shoe, 
the unseeing eye of the hysteric described in Freud’s essay ‘Psycho-
genic Visual Disturbance According to Psycho-Analytical Concep-
tions’, or a child’s cotton reel gleefully recovered from its precipice 
only to be destroyed yet again). The yoking of the Freudian drives 
to biological fittedness in neuropsychoanalysis, and the positing of 
addiction and masturbation as a ‘derangement’ of the drives, effec-
tively sets up psychic conflict as secondary. It therefore becomes 
avoidable through prudent (self-)management, rather than as that 
which, in psychoanalysis, constitutes the psyche in the first place.57
COrreCTive biOlOgy
Neuropsychoanalysis is already being described as that which takes 
up the mantle of 20th-century psychosomatics. Joseph Dodds has 
argued that neuropsychoanalysis addresses ‘the philosophically 
ancient discussion of the relation of mind and body, an issue at the 
heart of psychoanalysis from the start with its early work on hyster-
ical conversion… and later developments in the psychosomatics of 
the Paris School and beyond’.58 Meanwhile, as we complete this 
article in 2019, Mark Solms is on the point of publishing a new, 
revised, English language standard edition of Freud.59 Solms, who 
has had a long-held interest in translations of Freud’s work60 has, 
notably, indicated that in his role as translator he has ‘added some 
remarks on neuroscientific aspects of the Project for a Scientific 
Psychology’ and The Interpretation of Dreams’.61 It is therefore not 
far-fetched to imagine that the engine of neuropsychoanalysis will 
gain energy through the manufacture of a new English-language 
Freud for a new neuropsychoanalytic age. While it is impossible to 
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know prior to its publication how far neuropsychoanalytic styles 
of thought might inflect this translation, it is evident from Solms’s 
already published writings that he has felt free to import neuro-
psychoanalytic terms indebted to affective neuroscience as equiv-
alents for Freud’s own terms. Crucially, this importation includes 
the term ‘basic emotion’—a phrase signifying, as we have shown in 
our discussion of Panksepp, an inbuilt affect, and one radically at 
odds with psychoanalytic models of drive.62
Psychoanalysis, since the moment of its birth, has been defined 
by the question of translation. The drive is a kind of translation of 
the somatic to the psychic; Freudian repression has been theorised 
by the psychoanalyst Jean Laplanche as a failure of translation;63 
psychoanalysis translates concepts and phenomena, in the process 
transforming and defamiliarising them, and psychoanalysis is itself 
perpetually translated into other idioms and other languages. 
Neuropsychoanalysis comprises one more in the series of trans-
lations of psychoanalysis, through bringing psychoanalytic writ-
ings and epistemologies into intimate contact with experimental 
research in the life sciences. It is always important to take heed of 
what is discarded, occluded or transformed in acts of translation. 
The neuropsychoanalytic translation of Freud has rightly insisted 
on the embodied nature of the subject. But it has, we argue, through 
its commitment to the BESs, ended up removing the ‘other’ of the 
physiological within the physiological. For it has ended up seques-
tering fantasy from biology—and thereby has removed one of the 
most provocative possibilities for imagining what the terrain of the 
psychosomatic might be.
Neuropsychoanalysis effects this removal at the very moment at 
which it pursues its aim to install subjective intentionality within 
the physiological. Mark Solms, in his foreword to a series of 
case studies by the psychosomatic clinician Jean Benjamin Stora, 
emphasises the importance of Stora’s contributions by noting that 
they have been central to ensuring the ‘integration into physical 
medicine of the mental apparatus’.64 Here the field of neuropsy-
choanalysis appears at first glance as the protector of the radical 
insights of psychoanalysis in its redrawing of the perimeter and 
topology of the mental such that the mental burrows deep within 
the soma. But Solms then adds that the mental apparatus is ‘a 
“system” not fundamentally different from the other functional 
systems of the body, such as the digestive and respiratory tracts’.65 
Here, and across neuropsychoanalytic texts more broadly, we see a 
flattening whereby the mental apparatus is imagined as being of the 
same order as—and as epistemically available—as the functional 
systems of the body. Such a move, we argue, while appearing to 
lay the foundations for an engagement with the psychosomatic, 
introduces such an engagement bereft of the challenge that Freud’s 
invocation of the psychic apparatus, per se, installed. If the mental 
apparatus, like the other systems of the body, is returned to a 
familiar kind of functionality, this precisely disavows the other-
ness denoted by the Freudian unconscious, which is brought to life 
through hysterical conversion.
Neuropsychoanalysis is fond of arguing that it aims to complete 
the project that Freud himself ‘was forced—through lack of perti-
nent knowledge—to abandon’.66 Here, neuropsychoanalysis is 
visualised as a ‘cleaned up version’ of psychoanalysis—one that 
has ridded itself of Freud’s predilection for the speculative or the 
mythological, as well as his commitment to scientific paradigms 
that were outdated even at the moment in which he was writing. 
But in ridding psychoanalysis of the mythological, neuropsycho-
analysis also ends up disavowing that which the mythological 
was called to account for: that the work of the psyche cannot be 
wholly subsumed within the work of self-preservation and that the 
pleasure of the psychosomatic organism is not secured by the satis-
faction of vital needs.
The use of Panksepp’s affective neuroscientific foundations is 
able, on Solms and Zellner’s account, to replace Freud’s ‘unfortu-
nate tendency’ to cast affective ‘inherited structures in Lamarckian 
terms’,67 with a more robust, evolutionary framework. The propo-
nents of neuropsychoanalysis we have been discussing here claim 
that once one has stripped out these unfortunate tendencies from 
psychoanalysis, it is possible to discern that Panksepp and Freud 
are proposing essentially the same thing. Such a claim is possible 
because the full range of data and conceptual architecture that is 
drawn into the orbit of neuropsychoanalysis—the empirical, labo-
ratory-based findings, the insights drawn from the clinic, the parts 
of Freud that are deemed of use—are interpreted through the 
lenses of self-preservation and reproductive fittedness.
But this meta-discursive lens relies on a neuroevolutionary ‘back 
story’ that is, we suggest, just as mythological as that of Freud’s own 
evolutionary drama (with its ‘unfortunate’ Lamarckian tendencies, 
its primal horde, and its primal father). The anthropologist Allan 
Young has argued in his own research on the neurosciences that 
‘[m]yth is not antithetical to science’ and has employed the concept 
of the back story—‘a fictive or notional history that precedes the 
events described in the narrative’—to indicate how a ‘plausible 
genealogy of the social brain’ has been pieced together.68 The 
‘back story’ of the embodied brain in neuropsychoanalysis is far 
less narratologically complex and without the dialectical turns 
that characterise the back story that Young has pieced together in 
relation to social neuroscience. The embodied brain’s back story 
presupposes that ‘the emotional brain systems that generate…
affects have existed since the dawn of mammalian brain evolu-
tion’,69 such that ‘our common ancestor was already feeling 
powerful emotions long before humans walked the face of the 
earth’.70 On such an account, ‘[G]enes that create emotional brain 
networks can’, moreover, ‘figuratively be seen as the keepers of 
raw emotional memories—of retained dispositions and capacities 
that enable mammals to survive and to thrive’.71 Neuropsychoa-
nalysis wishes to strip from Freud his vision of ‘primal me walking 
with a primal horde’ fearing a ‘primal daddy coming with the 
scissors to cut-off our primal willies’, so as to be left with Pank-
sepp’s account of affect as ‘pre-programmed physiological and 
behavioural responses of great biological value signified by specific 
varieties of pleasurable or unpleasurable experience’.72 The myth-
ological figure of the ‘primal me’ no longer has a ‘primal daddy’ 
wielding a primal knife; she is, rather, the ancestral rat from the 
dawn of mammalian evolution whose SEEKING system comprises 
her ‘future-opportunity orient(ation)’ and provides her with the 
vital joie de vivre to keep her foraging and topping up her food 
supplies.73 The normativity that underpins the commitment to 
reproductive fittedness functions as a meta-discourse that subtends 
and determines the neuropsychoanalytic readings of findings and 
concepts emerging from both the neurosciences and from psychoa-
nalysis. The queer, psychosomatic vision of an organism that might 
experience urges to destroy ‘its own organic home’—which Freud 
sketched out in his lecture on ‘Anxiety and instinctual life’—is 
excised.
CONClusiON: NeurOpsyChOANAlysis ANd The 
psyChOsOmATiC
The feminist cultural theorist Elizabeth Wilson, in a series of 
powerful expositions on the domain of the psychosomatic, has 
demonstrated what might be possible if we break away from 
thinking and working with categorical models that quarantine the 
physiological from the psychological, the body from the mind.74 
Indeed, she has taken up precisely Jonathan Lear’s challenge of 
understanding how vomiting could be thinking. Through exploring 
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the melancholy and aggressiveness of various psychosomatic acts—
such as regurgitation—she insists that the ‘other’ of the physiolog-
ical within the physiological is recognised and put to work.75 Hers 
is a project which, unlike that of neuropsychoanalysts’ preoccupa-
tion with the embodied brain, pushes us to keep fantasy front and 
centre of any description of what the body is and does. Wilson, in 
her essay on neuropsychoanalysis, explicitly calls for the domains 
of biology, sexuality and fantasy to be conceptualised as ‘already 
native each to the other’, arguing that:
A psychosomatic structure built with already miscegenated compo-
nents is an altogether different beast—conceptually, empirically, po-
litically—from a psychosomatic structure that begins with discrete 
atomistic elements that only later come to be concatenated.76
In her investigation of how psychoanalysis and neuroscience 
might be thought together, she critiques many of the central 
formulations of neuropsychoanalysis for their overlooking of ‘lines 
of fissure’ between the neurosciences and psychoanalysis. She calls 
instead for a ‘mode of neuroscience–psychoanalysis that is strong 
because it is capable of tolerating, even enjoying and promoting, 
the process of being unbuttoned’ (italics added).77 Our article 
follows and expands on Wilson’s argument. We have previously 
argued that ‘current neuropsychoanalytic debates and exchanges 
make visible the intractability of moving between and across the 
axes of self-preservation and of Freudian sexuality’78—an intrac-
tability that we maintain should be embraced rather than covered 
over. While a number of 20th-century clinical investigations 
of the psychosomatic have indeed registered this intractability, 
neuropsychoanalysis has, Wilson laments, instead avoided ‘the 
wilder aspects of psychoanalytic theory’ and chosen ‘rectitude over 
variability’.79 This is, we think, one reason why clinical psycho-
somatic research—surely one of the ‘wilder aspects of psychoan-
alytic theory’—is rarely cited in neuropsychoanalytic texts. (This 
omission makes Solms’ own brief foray to the psychosomatic in his 
foreword to the volume by Stora all the more curious.)80
Neuropsychoanalysis is a scientific enterprise that claims for 
itself a space in which to understand motivated behaviours and, 
indeed, the embodied condition of being human. But despite its 
creativity and experimental vibrancy, neuropsychoanalysis, in its 
installation of a corrective biology as back story for the embodied 
brain, commits to an ideal, self-regulated subject ‘all the way 
down’—to use Monica Greco’s formulation.81 Neuropsychoanal-
ysis too neatly cleaves dysregulation from regulation; too easily 
envisages motivation in terms of the priority of maintaining—in 
ways that are narrowly determined—life. The psychosomatic—that 
astonishing domain described in the 1890s by Freud and Breuer in 
their account of conversion hysteria—by contrast scrambles our 
usual understandings of the physiological, corporeal, psychological 
and mental. Greco, in her own contribution to this special issue, 
points to one of the most startling contributions of psychosomatic 
medicine: the proposition that an organism itself ‘is expressive 
of evaluations and sensitive to sociocultural values as part of its 
living milieu’.82 This demands a radical reconsideration of what 
adaptation might mean. Adaptation might well imply and involve 
organic disease or psychopathology, since addressing the psycho-
somatic demands addressing and considering a subject’s own aims 
and values in relation to the particularity of different environ-
ments. Our present moment—one in which we witness all manner 
of political, social and environmental emergencies—demands 
supple ways of imagining and practising forms of relationality that 
recognise how psyches, bodies and ecologies are sutured together 
as well as burst asunder.83 What drives someone into sickness of 
various kinds—and on occasion allows her to exit from such a 
state—requires capacious accounts of how we, as human subjects, 
suffer. So-called harmful—psychopathological—practices can be, 
in a fundamental sense, ways to adapt, and therefore ways to live.
Neuropsychoanalysis would no doubt imagine itself to be well 
on the way to answering Jonathan Lear’s question—‘How could 
vomiting itself be “thinking”’? But we might wonder what the price 
of entry has been, as the psyche is assimilated into the neuropsy-
choanalytic body.
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